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Abstract 
 
 Previous research has been conducted that suggests that those who have trait anxiety have 
lower working memory capacity.  Lower working memory capacity has also been shown to 
increase the likelihood that one commits cognitive heuristics.  In the current research, we 
examined the relationship between one’s level of trait anxiety and their chances of committing 
the fundamental attribution error (FAE).  In the experiment participants were randomly selected 
into one of four different conditions.  Then participants completed the Spielberger trait anxiety 
scale which was used to separate participants into low and high trait anxiety groups.  In each 
condition participants read an essay about a course policy change and answered questions about 
the essay and the author to test whether or not they committed the FAE.  The essay was either 
pro- or anti-policy change and was either written under a choice condition or an assigned 
condition.  Results showed that trait anxiety had no effect on one’s likelihood of committing the 
FAE.  The only significant main effect was that of essay position which is consistent with 
previous research.  Future directions for research are discussed to explore this concept further.   
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The Effect of Trait Anxiety on the Fundamental Attribution Error 
 
Throughout their lives people make many errors in judgment and make irrational 
decisions.  People can sometimes unknowingly commit obvious judgmental errors on relatively 
simple tasks.   One error that is very prevalent among the general population is the fundamental 
attribution error.  The fundamental attribution error is the tendency for people to underestimate 
the impact of situational forces and overestimate the role of dispositional factors when making 
judgments (Forgas, 1998).  That is, people tend to overestimate the internal factors and 
underestimate the external factors when explaining the behavior of other people.  If a person was 
walking along a path in the woods and tripped someone committing the FAE would likely 
believe that that person is clumsy instead thinking that there may have been a root or rock that 
caused the person to trip.  The FAE is what is known as a cognitive heuristic which is a 
simplifying process used to reduce cognitive effort (O’Sullivan, 2003).  Heuristics can replace 
complex mental algorithms which can lead to reasonable judgments but they can also lead to 
severe irrational errors in judgment (Tversky & Khaneman, 1974).  Different variations of the 
FAE have been studied under different names such as the correspondence bias or the over-
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attribution bias (O’Sullivan, 2003).  The theory of FAE all began with the well renowned study 
conducted by Jones and Harris in 1967 on the attribution of attitudes (Jones & Harris, 1967). 
The study by Jones and Harris (1967) is the best known experiment that demonstrates the 
FAE even though they studied it under the name of the correspondence inference theory.  In the 
experiment subjects were given one of several short essays written about Castro’s dictatorship in 
Cuba.  The essay was written with either a pro-Castro stance or an anti-Castro stance.  The 
subjects were then either told that the person who wrote the essay had the freedom of choice to 
pick which side to defend or that the author was assigned which position to defend.  The subjects 
then answered a series of questions about the personal qualities of the author and the subject’s 
attitude about the topic.  The most important question was what the study subject believed was 
the authors true attitude toward Castro.  Results showed that the direction of the essay was the 
greatest factor in what people thought the authors true opinion was.  This is to be expected in the 
choice conditions but the results in the no choice conditions were also highly significant.  There 
was greatest variance in the no choice-pro condition which makes sense as that is the condition 
where the person is being told to argue against the popular belief.  However, subject’s still rated 
the author’s true opinions as being pro-Castro.  The main result of the experiment was that there 
was a tendency to attribute correspondence between the behavior of writing a pro-Castro essay 
and the private attitude of the author even when the author was assigned to write that way.  This 
is the basis of the FAE as the subjects unreasonably attributed attitudes, either pro or anti-Castro, 
to the author even in the no choice conditions.   
Prior research has been done on what affects the probability that someone will commit 
the FAE.  One such study was that conducted by Forgas (1998) who examined whether 
someone’s mood would affect the chances that they would commit the FAE.  In this experiment 
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subjects first took a test of their verbal abilities.  They then received positive, neutral, or negative 
feedback about their abilities which induced a corresponding happy, neutral, or negative mood in 
the participants.  They then were asked to read essays on a familiar issue written by a student 
participating in a debate and were either told that the student chose to represent the position or 
was assigned the position.  Participants were then asked to give their opinions on the writer by 
answering several 7-point bipolar questions.  Results showed that those who were in the good 
mood condition were more likely to commit the FAE than were those in the bad mood condition.  
These results provide evidence that mood could be associated with someone’s likelihood that 
they commit or do not commit the FAE. 
Mood is not the only factor that has been tested on the likelihood that someone will 
commit the FAE.  Horhota and Blanchard-Fields (2006) tested how beliefs and attributional 
complexity influenced someone’s correspondence bias.  In this study participants were asked 
their opinions about the author of an essay that was written on a topic of interest.  They were told 
that the author either chose to write on the topic or was assigned to write about that topic.  The 
results showed that older adults tended to have a more extreme attitude attribution rating than 
young adults.  This shows that older people may be more likely to commit the FAE error than 
younger people.   
Accountability is another factor that has been tested to see if it has an influence on the 
likelihood that someone will commit the FAE.  Tetlock (2006) tested how one’s level of 
accountability for their answers impacted their likelihood to commit the FAE.  This experiment 
was set up in a similar manner to other experiments testing the FAE.  Subjects were presented 
with either a pro- or anti-affirmative-action essay that was written under high- or low-choice 
conditions.  The subjects were also asked to answer questions about the writer of the essay.  
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Study subjects were then led to believe that they would either be held accountable for their 
impressions of the writer or not.  In the accountability condition subjects learned of being 
accountable for their opinions either before or after exposure to the essay.  Results showed that 
accountability was a significant moderator of the over attribution effect.  Subjects who did not 
feel accountable for their judgments were significantly more likely to have strong inferences 
about the attitudes of low-choice essay writers.   
A fourth study was conducted testing how social influence as a stimulus control 
influenced people’s likelihood to commit the FAE.  There were five different vignettes that 
subjects read where three were treatment vignettes and two were controls.  In the treatment 
vignettes there were two conditions in which the actor in the story was either alone or in the 
presence of others, which served as the social influence.  Subjects were then asked to attribute 
any percentage they chose to situational, dispositional, or purpose factors to explain the actions 
of the actor in the vignette.  The results of this study showed that the presence of others in the 
vignette led to an increase in subjects committing the FAE.   
As shown there has been plenty of research on variables which affects the likelihood that 
a person may commit the FAE.  An area which has not been explored yet is the effect that 
anxiety may have on one’s chances of committing the FAE.  Spielberger (1983) defined anxiety 
as, “the subjective feeling of tension, apprehension, nervousness, and worry associated with an 
arousal of the autonomic nervous system” (p. 1).  Spielberger (1972, 1983) also made a 
distinction between two different types of anxiety; trait or state anxiety.  Trait anxiety is used to 
describe a relatively stable personality variable whereas state anxiety is used to describe a 
transient emotional state where the feelings of anxiety can change based on the situation.  
Measures of anxiety are usually measured using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 
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Gorusch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983).  Anxiety seems to be an important factor to consider 
because research has shown that use of cognitive heuristics is a result of limited resources in 
working memory and research has show that anxiety reduces the limited resources of working 
memory. 
For the purposes of this study the most important effect of stress and anxiety has to do 
with their impact on the working memory component of the brain.  Baddeley’s model is the most 
well known and established theoretical conceptualization of working memory (Baddeley, 1986, 
2000, 2003).  According to Baddeley’s model working memory is where information is actively 
manipulated, processed, and temporarily stored.  Information in working memory can be 
rehearsed and then encoded in long-term memory or it will decay and be forgotten.  Working 
memory is also restricted by a limited capacity (Baddeley, 1986).  Working memory capacity is 
usually defined as the amount of information that can be processed and temporarily stored for a 
limited amount of time (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980).  Baddeley also broke working memory 
down into four components.  The main component is the central executive and then there are 
three “slave” systems known as the phonological loop, the visuospatial sketchpad, and the 
episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000).  The most important component is the central executive which 
is responsible for processing the information temporarily held in working memory.  Prior 
research has been conducted on how reduced working memory leads to an increase in the use of 
cognitive heuristics. 
A study conducted by Verschueren, Shaeken, and D’Ydewalle (2005) was done to test 
how working memory differences led to different methods for answering conditional reasoning 
questions.  They tested two different methods for answering conditional reasoning questions.  
The mental models account was when the person forms a mental representation of the content of 
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all relevant situations and draws a conclusion that is congruent with these models.  This method 
is believed to use a majority of the working memory resources.  The other method is less 
strenuous on working memory and this method is known as the probabilistic heuristic.  In this 
method people solve conditional inferences by taking into account the likelihood of the 
conclusion given the categorical premise of the problem.  In this study participants were 
separated into low, medium, and high working memory capacity groups using the operation span 
test (La Pointe & Engle, 1990; Turner & Engle, 1989).  The participants were then asked a series 
of inference problems and were asked to state their reasoning out loud.  The results of the study 
showed that those higher in working memory were more likely to use the mental models method 
than those with lower working memory.  Those with lower working memory relied more on the 
probabilistic heuristic to solve the inference problems.  This study supports the idea that those 
with lower working memory resources or limited working memory resources are more likely to 
use heuristic reasoning processes.  This is essential to this study as anxiety has been shown to 
reduce working memory capacity. 
There are two leading theories with supportive evidence about the effects of anxiety on 
cognitive performance.  One of the theories is known as the processing efficiency theory 
developed by Eysenck and Calvo in 1992.  Processing efficiency theory distinguishes between 
cognitive effectiveness and cognitive efficiency.  Effectiveness is related to the quality of 
performance on a certain task.  Efficiency is the relationship between effectiveness and the 
processing invested in the performance.  Thus, high processing efficiency is when there is a high 
level of performance while using relatively minimal cognitive resources.  Anxiety has a role to 
play in the processing efficiency theory (Eysneck & Calvo, 1992), as anxiety has an effect on the 
central executive component of working memory.  The cause for anxiety’s effect on the central 
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executive is believed to be that anxiety produces worry which then uses up some of the 
processing resources of working memory and thereby reduces processing efficiency (Baddeley, 
1986, 2002).  The task irrelevant thoughts that are produced as a result of anxiety are believed to 
affect performance by reducing the limited amount of attentional resources in working memory 
available to be allocated to the main ongoing task.   
The second theory about the affects of anxiety on cognitive performance is the attentional 
control theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007).  Attentional control theory is based 
on the premises of processing efficiency theory.  Eysenck et al. (2007) cited several reasons for 
the need to expand upon the premise of the processing efficiency theory and thus devised the 
attentional control theory.  One of their reasons was that the processing efficiency theory failed 
to specify which functions of the central executive were affected most by anxiety.  A second was 
that there were no assumptions about the effects of distracting stimuli on anxious individuals.  
The third was that the theory focused only on cognitive tasks involving neutral and nonemotional 
stimuli.  The fourth cited reason was that the processing efficiency theory does not consider 
cases in which high anxious individuals may outperform non-anxious individuals.  It is theorized 
that the central executive is responsible for attention and is involved with managing the 
allocation and focus of attentional systems (Conwan, 2001).  As the name implies a core 
assumption of attentional control theory is that anxiety has an effect on attention.  The theory 
states that anxiety impairs attentional control which is a function of the central executive 
component of working memory.  If this is the case anxious individuals are more likely to allocate 
attentional resources to threat-related stimuli.  These stimuli can either be internal, such as 
worrisome thoughts, or they can be external, such as threatening task-irrelevant stimuli.   
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Attentional control theory also relates to an attentional system theory developed by 
Corbetta and Shulman (2002).  According to their theory there are two attentional systems.  
There is the goal-directed attentional system, which is influenced by knowledge and current 
goals, and there is the stimulus-driven attentional system, which is influenced by salient stimuli.  
The goal-directed system is referred to as top-down processing whereas the stimulus-driven 
system is referred to as bottom-up processing.  According to the attentional control theory 
proposed by Eysenck et al. (2007) anxiety interrupts the balance between the two different 
systems.  Theoretically, anxiety increases the influence of bottom-up processing and decreases 
the influence of top-down processing.  Anxiety decreases performance by decreasing the goal-
driven attentional control system, especially the ability for the central executive to inhibit 
information, shift attention, and update information in working memory.  This causes a person to 
rely more on stimulus-driven attention (Eysenck, et al., 2007).  Tests have shown that anxiety 
has been associated with adverse effects on cognitive performance, especially when these tasks 
require attentional control (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009).  Studies have shown that the ability to 
control attention and remain focused is a large determinant of performance on working memory 
tasks (Engle, 2002; Kane, Bleckley, Conway & Engle, 2001).   
As previously stated worry is associated with the onset of anxiety within an individual.  
Worry is associated with uncontrollable thoughts about possible future negative events (Hayes, 
Hirsch, & Matthews, 2008).  The difference between a high worrier and a low worrier is the 
uncontrollability of negative thoughts once worry begins (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & 
DePee, 1983).  Research has shown that there are performance deficits on target tasks under 
high-memory load conditions for all participants but the deficits are greater in those with high-
anxiety than those with low-anxiety.  Eysenck and Calvo (1992) believe that the deficits are a 
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result of worrisome thought which deplete working memory capacity by reducing the amount of 
resources available to complete the target task.   
A study by Hayes, Hirsch, & Matthews (2008) tested the effect of worry versus 
nonworrisome thinking on working memory capacity in high and low worriers.  In the study 
participants filled out the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990).  Participants then performed a random key-press task while either thinking 
about a worry topic or a positive topic in counterbalanced order.  After completing one task 
participants completed mood and thought ratings.  Participants then performed a filler task for 
two minutes to prevent a carryover effect.  After this they were asked to complete the other 
thought condition and then complete the mood and thought ratings once again.  The results 
supported previous studies about anxiety that high worriers had less working memory capacity 
available when engaging in worrisome tasks than in positive thought tasks.  Also consistent with 
prior research were the results that high worriers reported higher levels of anxiety and 
depression.  Through covariance analysis the results supported prior research that the reduction 
in working memory capacity in high worriers was a result of the worry component of anxiety 
rather than the effect of one’s mood state (Rapee, 1993).  Overall, the results of the study by 
Hayes, Hirsch, & Matthews (2008) support prior research that worry affects working memory 
capacity.   
Research was conducted by Derakshan & Eysenck (1998) on verbal reasoning 
performance for high and low anxious subjects under high and low memory load conditions.  
Participants in the study completed the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983) as 
well as a scale which measures defensiveness called the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability 
Scale (Corwne & Marlowe, 1964).  The participants were then divided into low-anxious, 
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repressor, high-anxious, and defensive high-anxious groups.  Repressors are those who report 
low scores of anxiety on scales but are physiologically and behaviorally anxious (Newton & 
Contrada, 1992; Derakshan & Eysenck, 1997).  The same loading paradigm as MacLeod and 
Donnellan (1993) was used in the experiment.  Participants were presented with a reasoning task 
and either responded that the display was either true or false.  In low memory load trials a set of 
six zeroes was presented to participants before the display of the reasoning task.  In the high 
memory load trials there was a set of six random digits presented before the display of the 
reasoning task.  Participants were measured in both accuracy and response time.  In all groups 
the response on the verbal reasoning task was slower in the high memory load condition but this 
effect was greater for high-anxious groups than both the low-anxious and repressor groups.  
Response latencies on the memory test were also greater in the high memory load condition 
rather than the low memory load condition.  This was also qualified by an interaction with the 
high-anxious and defensive-high anxious groups being more affected than the low-anxious and 
repressor groups.  The error rate on the verbal reasoning task and memory load task was 
nonsignificant between the four groups.  These results support the theory that high-anxious and 
defensive-high anxious groups have more restricted working memory capacity than low-anxious 
and repressor groups.   
A study conducted by Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan (2005) tested the affect that anxiety 
would have on working memory during a cognitive task.  Their study used the Corsi Blocks Test 
(Corsi, 1972) which involves the central executive and the visuospatial sketchpad.  Participants 
were divided into high- and low-anxious groups based on their scores on the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983).  In the Corsi Blocks Test participants needed to tap blocks in 
the same pattern as the experimenter did after a five second delay.  There were also four different 
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secondary tasks.  The first was counting backwards by ones from a two-digit number out loud, 
the second was a spatial tapping task in which participants had to tap out a “z” pattern, the third 
was to repeat the letters A, B, C, and D out loud, and the fourth was a simple tapping task in 
which participants had to tap one spot on a tapping pad continuously.  The simple tapping task 
served as the control condition.  There was a significant difference in performance between the 
high- and low-anxious groups in the Corsi Blocks Test when the secondary task involved 
counting backwards.  The two anxiety groups did not differ in the three other secondary task 
conditions.  This is believed to be a result of the fact that only the counting backwards task 
required use of the central executive.  This experiment provided further evidence that high-
anxiety groups had reduced working memory capacity leading to more errors in the main and 
secondary tasks.   
A study conducted by Wiener, Ehbauer, & Mallot (2009) tested the affects of working 
memory capacity when it came to the use of planning heuristics in a spatial problem solving task.  
The spatial task was based on the traveling salesman problem which consists of finding the 
shortest closed loop connecting a starting location with multiple target locations.  There were 
three spatial planning heuristics that Wiener et al. discussed in the study.  The first was the 
nearest neighbor method in which participants visit the closest target that has not been visited 
until all targets have been visited.  The second was the cluster-strategy in which neighboring 
targets are clustered together and that the closest and largest clusters are visited first.  The third is 
the region-based strategy in which participants try to minimize the number of region boundaries 
they cross during navigation when trying to get to the nearest target.  By using these strategies 
participants reduce working memory demands when trying to navigate their routes.   
Trait Anxiety and the FAE 14 
 
In the first experiment participants were given a list with symbols defining their starting 
location and their target locations which they needed to maintain in working memory.  These 
corresponded to markers with the same symbols which were organized in a grid pattern 
throughout the room.  Results showed that with an increasing number of targets performance for 
discovering the optimal path decreased and start time increased.  This is believed to be due to the 
increased strain on working memory due to the higher number of target locations that must be 
kept in it.   
The second had three different conditions; the no memory condition, the spatial working 
memory condition, and the spatial working memory and long term memory condition.  In the no 
memory condition target location were marked in the environment.  In the spatial working 
memory condition participants were given a list of their target locations and needed to maintain 
that list in their working memory.  In the spatial working memory and long term memory 
condition the symbols in the environment were covered and participants had a training phase 
prior to the experiment where they learned the positions of the symbols.  Then participants were 
given a list of their target locations to find.  There were also two types of navigation tasks, 
region-strategy-adequate tasks and region-strategy-inadequate tasks.  For the optimal path in 
region-strategy-adequate tasks participants would need to visit all target locations in one region 
before going to the next region.  In region-strategy-inadequate tasks this region-based strategy 
planning would not lead to participants finding the optimal path.  Results indicated that there 
were significant effects for the number of targets and condition.  Planning performance 
decreased with an increased number of target locations.  Performance was best in the no memory 
condition and worst in the spatial working memory and long term memory condition.  
Participants were also more likely to find the optimal route in region-strategy-adequate tasks.  
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However, the influence of region-based planning was weakest in the no memory condition 
whereas it was stronger in the other two.  This is most likely due to the fact that in the other two 
conditions working memory was strained leading to the region-based planning heuristic.  
Overall, performance decreased while use of region-based planning heuristics increased with an 
increased working memory load.  This study showed that increased working memory strains led 
to an an increase in the use of heuristics. 
Based upon all of this previous research, we tested the affect of trait anxiety on one’s 
likelihood of committing the fundamental attribution error.  Research has shown that people use 
heuristics due to strains on their working memory capacity.  Studies have also shown that anxiety 
reduces working memory capacity.  Therefore, it is logical to believe that anxieties affects on 
working memory can lead to an increase in the use of cognitive heuristics.  Due to all of the prior 
research conducted on the negative effects of anxiety on working memory capacity we 
hypothesized that those high in trait anxiety would be more likely to commit the fundamental 
attribution error than those low in trait anxiety.   
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Method 
 
Participants 
 
 Data was collected over a period of five weeks in a psychology laboratory at Union 
College.  One hundred and thirty-nine Union College students participated in the study and were 
recruited through a college-wide online research signup system.  Three of the participant’s 
responses were disregarded due to the fact that they did not fully complete the questionnaire.  
Participants received either course credit or compensation for their participation in the study.  
Sixty males and seventy-nine females participated.  Their ages ranged from eighteen to twenty-
two years of age.   
Procedure  
 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions.  In all of the conditions 
participants read an essay about a potential course policy change at Union College that would 
raise the mandatory course load from three to four classes per trimester.  Participants were told 
the essay was the opening statement written by a student for their debate class.  In one condition, 
participants read an essay that was pro-course policy change.  They were also told that the author 
had a choice in which position they could take in the essay.  In the second condition, participants 
read an essay that was anti-course policy change.  They were also told that the author had a 
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choice in which direction they could write the essay.  In the third condition, participants read the 
same pro-course policy change essay as the participants in the first condition did.  However, 
these participants were told that the author was assigned to write for that position.  In the fourth 
condition, participants read the same anti-course policy change essay as participants in the 
second condition did.  These participants were told that the author was assigned to write for that 
position.  The essays were almost identical with only some substitutions of single phrases or 
qualifiers reversing the meaning of some sentences.  Each participant signed a consent form 
before beginning in which they were told the purpose of the study was to learn more about social 
perception.   
 Participants were first asked to fill out a questionnaire which was actually the trait 
anxiety subscale of the Spielberger state-trait anxiety inventory (Spielberger, Gorusch, Lushene, 
Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983).  This inventory asked twenty questions about how participants feel 
generally and asked them to rate it on a 4-pont scale with not at all being one and very much 
being four.  Participants were then asked to read the essay corresponding to whichever condition 
they were randomly assigned as well as fill out a questionnaire about the essay.  After reading 
the essay, participants were then asked about the essay and the author and rated their responses 
on a 7-point scale.  For questions pertaining to the participants thoughts about the author and the 
essay, one on the 7-point scale was extremely against and seven was extremely for.  The most 
important question was the one which asked the participants to what extent they believed the 
position advocated in the essay expressed the writer’s true opinion.  On this 7-point scale one 
was not sure at all and seven was very sure.  Then participants answered several questions about 
their global impressions of the write and these too were answered on a 7-point scale.  After this 
participants were debriefed and dismissed.   
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Results 
There were thirty-five subject’s in the assigned for condition, forty-two in the assigned 
against condition, thirty-four in the choice for condition, and twenty-eight in the choice against 
condition.  The participants were divided into high and low trait anxiety groups by splitting the 
groups using the median score on the trait anxiety subscale of the Spielberger state-trait anxiety 
scale.  Sixty-eight participants were categorized as low trait anxiety as they scored a forty-seven 
or below on the anxiety scale. Seventy-one participants were categorized as high trait anxiety.   
The participants were asked what they believed was the typical undergraduate’s opinion 
was on the policy as well as their own personal opinion on the policy.  Results indicated that the 
participants believed that the typical undergraduates opinion would be against a course policy 
change (M = 2.05).  The average participant’s own personal opinion was also against a policy 
change (M = 2.48).  Thus, the proposed policy did elicit a negative response from the student 
populace as expected.  An independent samples t-test was used to test whether there was a 
difference in the means between the pro- and anti-policy change essays for the question 
regarding the position of the essay.  There was a significant difference between the two 
conditions (t (137) = 12.59, p < .001).  This was expected and shows that the essays did reflect 
pro- and anti-policy change positions as was intended.   
It was then tested whether there was an effect for choice, position, and anxiety on 
whether the participant’s believed that the position of the essay was the true opinion of the 
author.  Scores on the question regarding the extent to which participant’s believe the position 
advocated in the essay expressed the writer’s true opinion, the means of which are presented in 
Figure 2, were submitted to a 2x2x2 univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA).  It was tested 
whether there was a difference between conditions and participant’s likelihood of believing the 
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essay advocated the author’s true opinion.  The only significant effect was for position (F (1,139) 
= 7.00), p = .01).  Those in the anti-policy change condition (M = 5.41) were more likely to 
believe that the essay advocated the author’s true opinion than those in the pro-policy change 
condition (M = 4.79).  There was no effect for anxiety (F (1,139) = 1.75, p = .19) or choice (F (1, 
139) = .89, p = .35).  The means did reflect that those with high anxiety (M = 5.24) had higher 
scores than those with low anxiety (M = 4.96) but this was not a significant difference.  Those 
with high anxiety in the choice anti-policy change condition had the highest mean score (M = 
5.93) while those in the low anxiety no choice pro-policy change had the lowest mean score (M 
= 4.36).  Overall, the only significant effect on whether people believed the essay advocated the 
author’s true opinion was the position of the essay. 
The next question examined was whether there was an effect for choice, position, and 
anxiety on what the participant believed the author’s personal opinion toward the course load 
policy was.  Scores on this question, the means of which are presented in Figure 4, were 
submitted to a 2x2x2 ANOVA.  The only significant main effect was the position of the essay (F 
(1, 139) = 148.36, p < .001).  Those in the pro-policy condition (M = 5.64) were more likely to 
believe that the author’s personal opinion was pro-policy change while those in the anti-policy 
condition (M = 1.93) were more likely to attribute an anti-policy change attitude to the author.  
There was almost a significant 2-way interaction between choice and position (F (1, 139) = 3.39, 
p = .068).  Also, although there were no significant effects besides position there were interesting 
mean scores.  Those with low anxiety in the pro-policy change condition had higher mean scores 
than those with high anxiety for both the choice (M = 5.95) and no choice (M = 5.79) conditions 
than those with high anxiety (M = 5.75) and (M = 5.29) respectively.  The same was not the case 
for those in the no choice anti-policy condition as those with high anxiety (M = 2.73) had a 
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higher score than those with low anxiety (M = 1.85).  Overall, there was no real difference 
between high anxiety (M = 3.75) and low anxiety (M = 3.79) attitude attribution scores.  In the 
pro-policy condition those with high anxiety had lower scores (M = 5.40) than those with low 
anxiety (M = 5.88).  The opposite was true in the anti condition where those with high anxiety 
had higher scores (M = 2.14) than those with low anxiety (M = 1.71).  The means show that 
there is no effect besides position on what subjects thought the personal opinion on the policy 
change was. 
The third important question examined whether there was an effect for choice, position, 
and anxiety on what the participants’ confidence in their judgment was regarding the question 
about the author’s personal opinion.  Scores on the question regarding how confident the 
participant was in their judgment in terms of answering the question about the author’s personal 
opinion on the policy, the means of which are presented in Figure 6, were submitted to a 2x2x2 
ANOVA.  There was no three way interaction between the three conditions (F (1, 139) = .21, p = 
.65) nor were there any other main effects.  The means for the low anxiety participant’s between 
the choice and no choice conditions were different in both the pro- and anti policy change 
conditions.  In the choice pro-policy change condition low anxiety participant’s mean was lower 
(M = 5.15) than those in the no choice condition (M = 6.07).  The same applied to the anti-policy 
change conditions where those in the choice condition (M = 5.14) had a lower mean than those in 
the no choice condition (M = 5.85) for low anxiety participant’s.  There was not as much of a 
difference in the means for those who had high trait anxiety.  Overall, there was no effect for any 
of the conditions on participants’ confidence in their judgments of the author’s attitude.   
Discussion 
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 Throughout life people sometimes unknowingly make errors in decision making and in 
judgment about many different facets of life.  It is all part of living in a world where not 
everything is always as it seems.  One such common error in judgment that people tend to make 
is the fundamental attribution error.  If one commits the fundamental attribution error they are 
overestimating the internal factors and underestimating the external factors when explaining the 
actions of other people.  Prior research has shown that a variety of factors can influence the 
likelihood that someone would commit FAE.  People who are in a good mood are more likely to 
commit the FAE than those who are in a bad mood (Forgas, 1998).  Older people also seem to be 
more likely to commit the FAE than younger people (Horhota & Blanchard-Fields 2006).   
The current study examined if there was a correlation between someone’s trait anxiety 
and their likelihood to commit the FAE.  The hypothesis that those with high trait anxiety were 
more likely to commit the FAE than those with low trait anxiety was not supported by the data.  
The only significant effect was the position of the essay, as essay direction was the strongest 
indicator of attitude attribution which is consistent with existing literature (Jones & Harris, 
1967).  Those who were in the anti-policy change condition were more likely to attribute an anti-
policy attitude to the author than those in the pro-policy change condition.  This is expected in 
the choice condition but was also found in the no choice condition.  This shows that even though 
participants were explicitly told that the author was assigned to take the position they wrote 
about, the participants still attributed that attitude to the author.  Thus, they were committing the 
FAE.   
It is reasonable that those in the anti-policy change condition were more likely to attribute 
that attitude to the author as the results did indicate that the student population was against the 
proposed policy change.  It was anticipated that the student population would be against the 
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proposed policy change and the results corroborated that expectation.  The anti-policy change 
essay could also have been more convincing overall and thus people were more likely to believe 
that that was the author’s true opinion.   
It was anticipated that those with high anxiety would have the highest likelihood of 
committing the FAE.  Overall, those with high anxiety did have a higher mean score than those 
with low anxiety but it was not a significant difference.  The choice condition did have a higher 
score which is logical as participants would believe that the essay reflected the authors true 
opinion if the author chose to take that specific stance in the essay.  However, the only 
significant effect was position in regards to the attitude attributed to the author by the 
participant’s.  
There was a significant main effect in terms of the direction of the essay for the question 
regarding what the participant’s believed the author’s opinion on the policy change was.  This 
was to be expected as that was answered using a bipolar scale.  Participants with an anti-policy 
change essay thought that the author was against the policy change while those who had a pro-
policy essay thought that the author was supportive of the policy change.  This showed that the 
position of the essay greatly influenced what the participant’s believed the author’s opinion on 
the policy was.   
There was no significant difference between the different conditions and the participant’s 
confidence in their judgment.  This was not expected as it was anticipated that those in the choice 
condition would be more confident in their responses than those in the no choice condition.  This 
was because it would make sense that if it was known that the author chose the position then the 
participant’s should be more confident in their attribution of the attitude to the author.  The 
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results were actually the opposite of what was expected as those in the no choice condition were 
more confident in their judgment of the author’s opinion than those in the choice condition. 
A possible limitation in the study was that the participants may not have correctly paid 
attention to or remembered the sentence regarding the choice, or lack of choice, that the author 
had in regards to the position taken in the essay.  This may have been a cause for the fairly 
similar means regarding participant’s beliefs of the author’s true opinion and their confidence in 
such judgments between the choice and no choice conditions.  A second possible limitation is 
that trait anxiety did not have the desired effect of decreasing the working memory capacity of 
participants.  Thus, there may have been no difference in the working memory resources between 
the high and low anxiety patients which could have lead to the lack of a significant difference 
between the groups.   
Future direction for research regarding trait anxieties influence on the likelihood one 
commits the FAE could explore increasing the strain on the limited resources of working 
memory.  One explanation for the lack of a main effect for anxiety is that trait anxiety alone does 
not occupy enough working memory resources in order to increase the chance that someone will 
commit the FAE.  Perhaps state anxiety, or both state and trait anxiety, would have more of an 
effect on one’s likelihood of committing the FAE. 
A second possible area that could be looked into would be to give the participant’s a 
working memory task to increase the strain on their working memory.  A task that would 
increase the strain on the limited capacity of working memory, such as the loading paradigm 
used by MacLeod and Donnellan (1993), could be used to see if that in conjunction with trait 
anxiety would have an effect on the likelihood one would commit the FAE.  Participants could 
be divided into high and low memory load conditions and tested in the same manner as the 
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current study.  The combined strain of the working memory task and trait anxiety may have more 
of an influence than just trait anxiety on its own.   
In conclusion, the current study did not give any insight into a factor that will increase a 
person’s likelihood of committing the FAE as expected.  However, further investigations into the 
effects of strained working memory on the chances that someone commits the FAE should be 
explored as it may lead to new insights as to why people commit the FAE.   
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Appendix A 
 
Between-Subjects Factors 
 Value Label N 
choice 1.00 choice 62 
2.00 no choice 77 
position 1.00 pro 69 
2.00 anti 70 
codeanxiety 1.00 high 71 
2.00 low 68 
    
Figure 1: Subjects By Condition 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable:trueopinion 
choice position codeanxiety Mean Std. Deviation N 
choice pro high 5.0000 1.70970 14 
low 4.7000 1.83819 20 
Total 4.8235 1.76619 34 
anti high 5.9286 1.07161 14 
low 5.2857 1.13873 14 
Total 5.6071 1.13331 28 
Total high 5.4643 1.47779 28 
low 4.9412 1.59433 34 
Total 5.1774 1.55262 62 
no choice pro high 5.0000 1.48324 21 
low 4.3571 1.54955 14 
Total 4.7429 1.52128 35 
anti high 5.1818 1.05272 22 
low 5.4000 1.78885 20 
Total 5.2857 1.43622 42 
Total high 5.0930 1.26893 43 
low 4.9706 1.74920 34 
Total 5.0390 1.49069 77 
Total pro high 5.0000 1.55299 35 
low 4.5588 1.70900 34 
Total 4.7826 1.63482 69 
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anti high 5.4722 1.10805 36 
low 5.3529 1.53509 34 
Total 5.4143 1.32417 70 
Total high 5.2394 1.35715 71 
low 4.9559 1.66109 68 
Total 5.1007 1.51464 139 
Figure 2: Mean Scores for Question Pertaining to Author’s True Opinion on Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:trueopinion 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 23.317a 7 3.331 1.488 .177 
Intercept 3485.861 1 3485.861 1557.075 .000 
choice 1.987 1 1.987 .887 .348 
position 15.669 1 15.669 6.999 .009 
codeanxiety 3.906 1 3.906 1.745 .189 
choice * position .175 1 .175 .078 .780 
choice * codeanxiety .561 1 .561 .251 .618 
position * codeanxiety .561 1 .561 .251 .618 
choice * position * 
codeanxiety 
3.027 1 3.027 1.352 .247 
Error 293.273 131 2.239   
Total 3933.000 139    
Corrected Total 316.590 138    
a. R Squared = .074 (Adjusted R Squared = .024) 
 
Figure 3:  Interactions Between Different Factors for Question Pertaining to Author’s True  
     Opinion on Policy 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable:authorsopinion 
choice position codeanxiety Mean Std. Deviation N 
choice pro high 5.5714 2.06488 14 
low 5.9500 1.60509 20 
Total 5.7941 1.78851 34 
anti high 1.2143 .42582 14 
low 1.5000 1.09193 14 
Total 1.3571 .82616 28 
Total high 3.3929 2.65747 28 
low 4.1176 2.62580 34 
Total 3.7903 2.64350 62 
no choice pro high 5.2857 2.32686 21 
low 5.7857 2.00686 14 
Total 5.4857 2.18782 35 
anti high 2.7273 2.25054 22 
low 1.8500 1.49649 20 
Total 2.3095 1.95670 42 
Total high 3.9767 2.60483 43 
low 3.4706 2.59645 34 
Total 3.7532 2.59633 77 
Total pro high 5.4000 2.19893 35 
low 5.8824 1.75404 34 
Total 5.6377 1.99242 69 
anti high 2.1389 1.91465 36 
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low 1.7059 1.33778 34 
Total 1.9286 1.66221 70 
Total high 3.7465 2.62253 71 
low 3.7941 2.61202 68 
Total 3.7698 2.60800 139 
Figure 4:  Mean Scores for Question Pertaining to Author’s Personal Opinion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:authorsopinion 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 506.841a 7 72.406 21.967 .000 
Intercept 1865.290 1 1865.290 565.904 .000 
choice 4.170 1 4.170 1.265 .263 
position 489.005 1 489.005 148.358 .000 
codeanxiety .172 1 .172 .052 .820 
choice * position 11.174 1 11.174 3.390 .068 
choice * codeanxiety 2.266 1 2.266 .687 .409 
position * codeanxiety 4.514 1 4.514 1.370 .244 
choice * position * 
codeanxiety 
3.446 1 3.446 1.045 .308 
Error 431.792 131 3.296   
Total 2914.000 139    
Corrected Total 938.633 138    
a. R Squared = .540 (Adjusted R Squared = .515) 
 
Figure 5: Interactions Between Different Factors for Question Pertaining to Author’s  
                Personal Opinion on Policy 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable:confidence 
choice position codeanxiety Mean Std. Deviation N 
choice pro high 5.5714 2.17377 14 
low 5.1500 1.56525 20 
Total 5.3235 1.82110 34 
anti high 5.2857 1.77281 14 
low 5.1429 2.14322 14 
Total 5.2143 1.93136 28 
Total high 5.4286 1.95180 28 
low 5.1471 1.79448 34 
Total 5.2742 1.85693 62 
no choice pro high 5.5714 1.56753 21 
low 6.0714 .91687 14 
Total 5.7714 1.35225 35 
anti high 5.5909 1.43623 22 
low 5.8500 1.56525 20 
Total 5.7143 1.48629 42 
Total high 5.5814 1.48376 43 
low 5.9412 1.32439 34 
Total 5.7403 1.41795 77 
Total pro high 5.5714 1.80336 35 
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low 5.5294 1.39773 34 
Total 5.5507 1.60455 69 
anti high 5.4722 1.55813 36 
low 5.5588 1.82891 34 
Total 5.5143 1.68319 70 
Total high 5.5211 1.67212 71 
low 5.5441 1.61554 68 
Total 5.5324 1.63876 139 
Figure 6:  Mean Scores for Question Pertaining to Participants Confidence in Judgment 
 
 
 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:confidence 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 12.115a 7 1.731 .632 .728 
Intercept 4086.624 1 4086.624 1493.342 .000 
choice 7.810 1 7.810 2.854 .094 
position .511 1 .511 .187 .666 
codeanxiety .079 1 .079 .029 .865 
choice * position .017 1 .017 .006 .937 
choice * codeanxiety 3.658 1 3.658 1.337 .250 
position * codeanxiety .003 1 .003 .001 .974 
choice * position * 
codeanxiety 
.564 1 .564 .206 .651 
Error 358.490 131 2.737   
Total 4625.000 139    
Corrected Total 370.604 138    
a. R Squared = .033 (Adjusted R Squared = -.019) 
 
Figure 7: Interactions Between Different Factors for Question Pertaining to Participants    
                Confidence in Judgment  
 
 
